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ll usThis paper is the first to present direct evidence showing how local-
ized knowledge spillovers arise from workers changing jobs within
the same local labor market. Using a unique data set combining So-
cial Security earnings records and balance sheet information for the
Veneto region of Italy, I first identify a set of highly productivefirms,
then show that hiring workers with experience at these firms signif-
icantly increases the productivity of other firms. My findings imply
that worker flows explain around 10% of the productivity gains ex-
perienced by incumbent firms when new highly productive firms are
added to a local labor market.I. Introduction
Aprominent feature of the economic landscape inmany developed coun-
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Aproducts or services. In the United States, for example, biopharmaceutical
firms are clustered in New York and Chicago, and a sizeable share of the
elevator and escalator industry is concentrated in the area around Bloom-
ington, Indiana. Furthermore, the growth and diffusion of multinational
corporations has led to the recent appearance of important industrial clus-
ters in several emerging economies (Alfaro and Chen 2014).
Researchers have long speculated that firms in such industrial concentra-
tions may benefit from agglomeration economies, and a growing body of
work has been devoted to studying the importance of these economies. De-
spite the difficulties involved in estimating agglomeration effects, a consen-
sus has emerged that significant productivity advantages of agglomeration
exist for many industries (Henderson 2003; Rosenthal and Strange 2003;
Cingano and Schivardi 2004; Ellison, Glaeser, and Kerr 2010; Greenstone,
Hornbeck, and Moretti 2010; Combes et al. 2012; Gathmann, Helm, and
Schönberg 2016). Disagreement remains, however, over the nature of the
microeconomic mechanisms that can account for these advantages (Glaeser
and Gottlieb 2009; Moretti 2011). This serves as a barrier to understanding
differences in productivity across industry clusters and localities and hin-
ders the design of location-based policies (Glaeser and Gottlieb 2008; Kline
2010).
Localized knowledge spillovers are one of the most commonly hypoth-
esized sources of the productivity advantages of agglomeration, alongside
the availability of specialized intermediate inputs, the sharing of a common
labor pool, and better matching. Nevertheless, if information can easily flow
out of firms, the question why the effects of spillovers are localized must be
clarified—a point well made by Combes and Duranton (2006).
This is the first paper to present direct evidence showing how firm-to-
firm labor mobility enhances the productivity of firms located near highly
productive firms. In doing so, it lends support to the idea that the strong lo-
calized aspect of knowledge spillovers discussed in the agglomeration liter-
ature arises—at least in part—from the propensity of workers to changeniversitat Autònoma de Barcelona, the University of Alicante, Collegio Carlo
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Ajobs within the same local labormarket (LLM): knowledge is partly embed-
ded in workers and diffuses when workers move between firms.1
To fix ideas, I begin by presenting a simple conceptual framework in
which somefirms aremore productive because they possess superior knowl-
edge. The superior knowledge could include information about export
markets, physical capital, new organizational forms, and intermediate in-
puts. Employees at these firms acquire relevant firm’s internal knowledge—
for simplicity, I refer to these employees as “knowledgeable”workers.Other
firms can then gain access to this superior knowledge byhiring suchworkers.
The central empirical goal of the paper is to measure the importance of
labor market–based knowledge spillovers. In confronting the nontrivial
measurement challenges involved, I take advantage of a unique data set that
combines Social Security earnings records and detailed financial informa-
tion for firms in Veneto, a region of Italy with many successful industrial
clusters. In the empirical analysis, I identify potential high-productivity
firms as those that pay a relatively highfirm-specificwage premium.2 I show
that these high-wage firms (HWFs) have significantly higher total factor
productivity (TFP) and value added than other firms inmy sample, suggest-
ing the presence of a firm-specific advantage and thus a point of origin for
the transfer of knowledge. For convenience, I refer to theseHWFs as “good”
firms.
Next, I evaluate the extent towhichotherfirmsbenefit fromhiring knowl-
edgeable workers by studying the effect on productivity associated with
hiring workers with recent experience at these good firms. Given that work-
ers do not move from firm to firm on a random basis, my analysis addresses
important identification threats. In particular, positive productivity shocks
that are correlated with the propensity to hire knowledgeable workers may
give rise to an upward bias in the estimated impact of such knowledgeable
workers.3 To address this potential endogeneity issue, I use well-established
control function methods drawn from the productivity literature (Olley
and Pakes 1996; Levinsohn and Petrin 2003).4 In doing so, I find that, on
average, recruiting a knowledgeable worker increases the productivity of1 Other possibilities include various forms of communication externalities: face-
to-face meetings, word-of-mouth communication, and direct interactions between
skilled workers from different firms (Charlot and Duranton 2004).
2 This is consistent with many recent models of frictional labor markets (e.g.,
Christensen et al. 2005) in which higher-productivity firms pay higher wages for
equivalent workers. Results are similar when using alternative groupings of firms
based on output (controlling for inputs) and value added.
3 Examples of such shocks are process innovations and new managerial tech-
niques.
4 Olley and Pakes (1996) construct an explicit model for the firm’s optimization
problem in order to obtain their production function estimator. Essentially, the au-
thors address the issue of endogeneity of inputs by inverting the investment func-
tion to back out—and thus control for—productivity. Building on Olley and Pakes
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Aa non-high-wage firm (non-HWF) by between 1.8% and 3%.5 Additional
evidence supports themainfinding that the recruitment of workerswith ex-
perience at good firms significantly increases the productivity of the non-
HWFs hiring them. I observe greater productivity gains in firms hiring
workers in higher-skilled occupations. The productivity effect of knowl-
edgeable workers does not appear to be driven by unobservedworker qual-
ity,6 and it is not associated with recently hired workers in general; placebo
regressions show that there is no similar productivity effect for recently
hired workers with experience at firms that have lower productivity than
the receiving firm. These results indicate that the estimated effect is not
due to better worker-firm matching or to switchers being more productive
than stayers in general (regardless of previous employment history). I also
rule out the possibility that the results are driven by time-invariant un-
observables, such as managerial talent.
It is also possible that knowledgeable workers are attracted to join firms
that are “on the rise,” (i.e., firms that offer better prospects than the good
firms at which these workers are employed) rather than knowledgeable
workers moving to firms and causing the increase in productivity. To ad-
dress this concern, I adapt control function methods to proxy for future
productivity shocks. In addition, I instrument for the number of knowl-
edgeable workers employed by a non-HWFwith the number of good firms
locally in the same industry that downsized in the previous year. Following
a downsizing event at a good firm, it is more likely that a knowledgeable
worker applies for a job at local non-HWFs because she is unemployed
and does not want to relocate far away. Put differently, in the scenario cap-
tured by the instrumental variable (IV) approach, the strategic mobility ex-
planation is less likely to play a role.7 Applying this approach, the IV esti-(1996), Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) suggest the use of intermediate input demand
in place of investment demand as a proxy for unobserved productivity.
5 In interpreting my estimates, it is important to highlight that non-HWFs are
quite small: their median number of employees is 33. Furthermore, as many as 78%
of non-HWFs in a given year do not employ any knowledgeable workers. Hiring
one knowledgeable worker therefore implies a significant change in terms of work-
force for most firms in my data.
6 To investigate this issue, I obtain a proxy for worker ability using estimates of
worker fixed effects from wage equations where both firm and worker effects can
be identified.
7 While the timing of these moves is arguably exogenous, knowledgeable work-
ers may still decide which new employer to join among the set of non-HWFs after
being displaced by good firms. However, in small labor markets and specialized in-
dustries, workers are likely to have a limited set of alternatives. Note also that this is
a new approach: the number of downsizing local good firms is used as an instru-
ment for a firm input in a production function framework, and to date only past
values of the regressors themselves or input prices have been used for instrumenta-
tion in the production function literature (see the survey by Eberhardt andHelmers
2010).
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Amates return an economically and statistically significant coefficient on the
number of knowledgeable workers. The exclusion restriction would be vi-
olated and the coefficient on knowledgeable workers biased upward if there
were localized unobservable industry-specific shocks that led good firms to
downsize and positively affect measured productivity at non-HWFs. An
example of such shocks is unobserved shifts in local demand from the prod-
ucts of HWFs to the products of non-HWFs. I obtain data on the level of
tradability of goods and show reassuring evidence regarding the relevance
of such shocks.
In the second part of the paper, I evaluate the extent to which labor mo-
bility can explain the productivity advantages of firms located near other
highly productive firms. Here, I relate my findings on the effect of firm-
to-firm labor mobility to the existing evidence on the productivity advan-
tages of agglomeration, focusing on a study by Greenstone, Hornbeck, and
Moretti (2010). These authors find that following the opening of a large
manufacturing plant, the TFP of incumbent plants in the US counties that
were able to attract these large plants increased significantly relative to the
TFP of incumbent plants in counties that survived a long selection process
but narrowly lost the competition. The observed effect on TFP in Green-
stone, Hornbeck, and Moretti (2010) is larger if incumbent plants are “eco-
nomically” close to the large plant; measures of economic links include a
dummy indicating belonging to the same industry and indicators of tech-
nological linkages and worker flows at the industry level. Furthermore, this
TFP effect increases over time. These facts are consistentwith the presence of
intellectual externalities that are embodied in workers who move from firm
to firm. However, data limitations prevented Greenstone, Hornbeck, and
Moretti (2010) from drawing definitive conclusions regarding the underly-
ing mechanism. Building on their analysis, I am able to evaluate the extent
towhichworkerflows explain the productivity advantages of agglomeration
by predicting the change in local productivity following an event analo-
gous to that studied by Greenstone, Hornbeck, and Moretti (2010) within
the worker mobility framework described above. I find that the predicted
change in productivity is around 10%of the overall local productivity change
observed after the event.8 Finally, I show that the local productivity effect at-
tributed to goodfirms does not appear to be associatedwith a general increase8 The remaining portion is likely to be explained by other types of knowledge
spillovers not based on labor mobility (i.e., various forms of communication exter-
nalities) and the availability of specialized intermediate inputs. That labor market–
based knowledge spillovers account for 10% of agglomeration advantages is consis-
tentwith the estimates in Ellison,Glaeser, andKerr (2010), whofind that knowledge
spillovers do not account for a large fraction of agglomeration economics, and with
the estimates in Kantor and Whalley (2014), who find smaller spillovers from uni-
versities than Greenstone, Hornbeck, and Moretti (2010) find from large manufac-
turing plants.
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Ain the size of the labor market: large productivity gains linked to changes in
the number of firms seem to be realized onlywhen the new entrants are good
firms. This evidence suggests that the estimated impact does not reflect better
worker-firm matching arising from a thicker labor market.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II I relate
my research to the existing literature. Section III presents a conceptual frame-
work that guides the empirical exercise and then discusses my econometric
strategy. In Section IV I describe the data and present descriptive results.
Themain regression results, in addition to various extensions and robustness
checks, are presented in Sections V, VI, and VII. Section VIII concludes.
II. Relation to Previous Research
This paper adds to the growing literature examining productivity advan-
tages through agglomeration, a literature reviewed in Duranton and Puga
(2004), Rosenthal and Strange (2004), and Moretti (2011). The research re-
lating most closely to this paper studies the micro foundations of agglom-
eration advantages based on knowledge spillovers. In the theoretical analy-
sis by Combes and Duranton (2006), firms clustering in the same locality
face a trade-off between the advantages of labor pooling (i.e., access to
knowledge carriers) and the costs of labor poaching (i.e., loss of some key
employees to competitors along with higher wage bills to retain other key
employees).9 In a case study of the British Motor Valley, Henry and Pinch
(2000, 198–99) conclude the following:
As personnel move, they bring with them knowledge and ideas about
how things are done in other firms helping to raise the knowledge
throughout the industry. . . . The crucial point is that whilst this process
may not change the pecking order within the industry, this ‘churning’
of personnel raises the knowledge base of the industry as a whole with-
in the region. The knowledge community is continually reinvigorated
and, synonymous with this, so is production within Motor Sport Val-
ley.
I contribute to the literature on the micro foundations of agglomeration
advantages by showing direct evidence of productivity gains throughworker
flows.109 The study of research-and-development spillover effects by Bloom, Schanker-
man, and Van Reenen (2013) points out the presence of two countervailing effects:
positive technological spillovers and negative business-stealing effects on the prod-
uct market. The authors provide evidence that although both types of effects oper-
ate, technological spillovers quantitatively dominate.
10 Given the Veneto industry mix, discussed in Sec. IV, our findings are more rel-
evant for traditional manufacturing regions, such as Germany’s Baden-Wuerttemberg
and the British Motor Valley than for high-tech regions like Silicon Valley, analyzed
by Saxenian (1994), or Cambridge, United Kingdom.
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ASome research outside the agglomeration literature has also emphasized that
firm-to-firm labor mobility may enhance the productivity of firms. Das-
gupta (2012) studies a dynamic general equilibrium model with mobility
of workers among countries in which the long-term dynamic learning pro-
cess plays a crucial role. Workers in the model learn from their managers,
and knowledge diffusion takes place through labor flows. Other theoretical
contributions include the studies by Cooper (2001), Markusen (2001),
Glass and Saggi (2002), and Fosfuri, Motta, and Rønde (2001). Several con-
vincing firm-level empirical analyses have already been conducted: Poole
(2013) finds a positive effect of the share of new workers previously em-
ployed by foreign-owned firms on wages paid in domestic firms in Brazil;
Balsvik (2011) offers a detailed account of productivity gains linked toworker
flows from foreign multinationals to domestic firms in Norway; Parrotta
and Pozzoli (2012) provide evidence from Denmark regarding the positive
impact of the recruitment of knowledge carriers (technicians and highly ed-
ucated workers recruited from a donor firm) on a firm’s value added; and
Stoyanov and Zubanov (2012) show that Danish firms that hired workers
from more productive firms become more productive.11
My findings are consistent with the recent empirical contributions of
Poole (2013), Balsvik (2011), Parrotta and Pozzoli (2012), and Stoyanov
and Zubanov (2012) that study worker flows using linked worker-firm
data. In terms of the firm-level analysis, which is the focus of the first part
ofmypaper, I build on their research and offer (1) a newdefinition of “knowl-
edgeable” workers and (2) additional hypotheses testing that leaves less
room for alternative interpretations of the main results. Unlike the above
authors, who focus exclusively on the relationship between labor mobility
and productivity at thefirm level, I also seek to shed light on a broader ques-
tion: To what extent can labor mobility explain the productivity advantages
through agglomeration (at both firm and LLM levels)? While the issues an-
alyzed in this paper are of general interest, the specific case of Veneto is also
important. This region is part of a larger economic area in Italy where net-11 The related literature also includes Agrawal, Cockburn, and McHale (2006),
who look at patent citations when workers move across firms; Irarrazabal, Moxnes,
and Ulltveit-Moe (2013), who argue that worker heterogeneity accounts for much
of the exporting premium of firms; and De la Roca and Puga (2017), who look at
mobility of workers across cities. Another related body of work analyzes peer ef-
fects in the workplace induced by knowledge spillovers and finds mixed evidence.
On one hand, Waldinger (2010) finds that faculty quality is a very important deter-
minant of PhD student outcomes. On the other hand, Cornelissen, Dustmann, and
Schönberg (2016) find only small peer effects in wages in high-skilled occupations,
and Waldinger (2012) shows that even very high-quality scientists do not affect the
productivity of their local peers. Guryan, Kroft, and Notowidigdo (2009) study
teammates in golf and find no evidence of knowledge spillovers. Other papers within
this body of work, focusing on social pressure, report productivity spillovers (Mas
and Moretti 2009; Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul 2010).
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Aworks of specialized firms, frequently organized in districts, have been ef-
fective in promoting and adapting to technological change during the last
3 decades. This so-called Third Italy region has received a good deal of at-
tention by researchers, both in the United States and in Europe (Brusco
1983; Piore and Sabel 1984; Trigilia 1990; Piore 2009).
III. Framework and Empirical Strategy
A. Conceptual Framework
Consider a finite number of locations, each constituting a separate LLM.
To fix ideas, assume that these labor markets are completely segmented,
with workers being immobile among them. There exists a finite collection
J 5 fJ 0, J 1g of firms consisting of the set J1 of good firms, which are
more productive because they have some superior knowledge, and the set
J0 of other (nongood) firms, which have no access to superior knowledge.
The superior knowledge is exogenously given and could include informa-
tion about export markets, physical capital, process innovations, new man-
agerial techniques, new organizational forms, and intermediate inputs. Work-
ers employed by good firms acquire the relevant firm’s internal knowledge.12
Workers are either knowledgeable or unknowledgeable. All workers em-
ployed by good firms, because of their access to the firm’s internal knowl-
edge, are knowledgeable. Additionally, this knowledge can be transferred
to a j ∈ J 0 firm if the workers switch employers.
The production function of firm j ∈ J 0 is
Yj 5 FðLj,Kj,MjÞ 5 Aj½Laj K gj Mlj d, (1)
where Lj 5 Hj 1 Nj, that is, the sum of knowledgeable workers Hj (who
moved at some point from a good firm to a nongood firm) and unknowl-
edgeable workers Nj; Kj is total capital inputs; and Mj is material inputs.
The managerial technology involves an element of diminishing returns to12 For simplicity, I assume that this acquisition of internal knowledge takes place
immediately after the workers join the good firm. I also assume that this type of
knowledge cannot all be patented and that exclusive labor contracts are not avail-
able. An interesting aspect, which is, however, not empirically investigated in this
paper, concerns firm-level heterogeneity in the incentives to keep the knowledge
secret and the strategy to prevent the transfer. In an email interview, an industry
expert discussed this very issue: “Veneto firms for several reasons are often unwill-
ing to patent, but they keep some trade secrets, at least as tacit knowledge. . . . Think
of prosecco firms each producing a wine different from the other; this means that
the added components, eg. sugar or yeast, and blends are part of the secret. . . . A
key player in this regard is the oenologist who de facto establishes the ‘wine for-
mula.’ . . . Trade secrets exist not only in large firms eg. Zonin or Ferrari, but also
in cooperatives like Caviro, with the secret guarded by an aggregator who then
governs the chain.”
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Ascale, or to “span of control” (d < 1).13 I allow for knowledge transfer by let-
ting efficiency depend on Hj:
Aj 5 DjebHHj , (2)
whereAj denotes TFP andDj denotes the component of TFP due to factors
other thanH. See appendix section A.I (the appendix is available online) for
a formal discussion of the firm optimization problem.
B. Empirical Strategy
I obtain the regression equation that forms the basis of my empirical anal-
ysis by combining equations (1) and (2) and taking logs:
lnðYjsltÞ 5 bL lnðLjsltÞ 1 bK lnðKjsltÞ 1 bM lnðMjsltÞ 1 bHHjslt 1 b0 1 z jslt: (3)
The dependent variable in much of my analysis is the real value of total
firm production; s denotes industry, l denotes locality, and t denotes year.
SectionV.C reports estimation results for alternative specifications (in terms
of functional forms of H and measures of productivity).14 The variable of
interest, H (the number of knowledgeable workers), is constructed from
head counts in the matched employer-employee data.15 I define a worker
as being knowledgeable (having recent experience at a good firm) in year
t if he or she is observed working in a good firm for one ormore of the years
t 2 3 to t 2 1.16 Inwhat follows, I use “knowledgeableworkers” and “work-
ers with recent experience at good firms” interchangeably.
The structure of regression equation (3) is in line with that inGreenstone,
Hornbeck, andMoretti (2010), who also regressfirm-level output on inputs13 This is in line with the large presence, which I document below, of small and
medium-sized firms in the sample of nongood firms. This description of manage-
ment follows Lucas (1978, 51) who assumes that “each agent is endowed with a
managerial talent level x, drawn from a fixed distribution G :R1 → ½0, 1. If agent
xmanages resources n and k, his ‘firm’ produces xg½ f ðn, kÞ units of output, where
g :R1→R1 is twice-differentiable, increasing, and strictly concave, satisfying
gð0Þ 5 0. . . . Whatever managers do, some do it better than others. Given this as-
sumption, however, one is led immediately to the question: why does the best man-
ager not run everything? Therefore, I assume concavity in the function g.”
14 Notice that bL 5 da, bK 5 dg, and bM 5 dl.
15 In Sec. V.D I also employ an alternative, continuous measure of the receiving
firm’s exposure to knowledge, which exploits the productivity differences between
sending and receiving firms (in the spirit of Stoyanov and Zubanov 2012), thus ex-
tending the baseline analysis that works with a dummy indicating experience at a
good firm. Furthermore, I present estimates when I lag the number of workers with
experience at good firms.
16 It may be instructive to consider a practical example. Consider a worker who
separates from a good firm in 1994 and joins nongood firm j in 1995. Provided that
the worker remains in j, she will be counted as a knowledgeable worker for every
year from 1994 to 1997. Results are similar if I consider a 5-year window instead of
a 3-year one.
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A(and let productivity depend on the presence of large plants that generated
bidding from local governments). The estimation of such productivity spec-
ification on balance sheet data allowsme, in Section VI, to relate directlymy
findings regarding the effect of firm-to-firm labor mobility to the evidence
in Greenstone, Hornbeck, and Moretti (2010).
In equation (3), the term ln(Dj) is decomposed into two elements, b0 and
zjslt. The constant b0 denotes mean efficiency across all firms inJ0 that is due
to factors other thanH. The time-variant zjslt represents deviations from this
mean efficiency level and captures (i) unobserved factors affecting firm out-
put, (ii) measurement error in inputs and output, and (iii) random noise. Es-
timating the effect of recruiting a knowledgeable worker on a firm’s pro-
ductivity is difficult in the presence of unobservable productivity shocks
(contemporaneous or future). I turn now to describing what type of biases
these time-varying unobservables may introduce and how I deal with them
in the empirical work.
In Section V.C I discuss estimates using the within transformation to ad-
dress the possibility that the estimated productivity gains are due to time-
invariant unobservables, such as managerial talent.
1. Unobserved Productivity Shocks
Unobservable Contemporaneous Shocks
I express the deviations from mean firm efficiency not resulting from
knowledge transfer, zjslt, as
z jslt 5 q*jslt 1 njslt 5 mst 1 -lt 1 qjslt 1 njslt, (4)
which specifies that zjslt contains measurement error njslt and a productivity
component q*jslt (TFP) known to the firm but unobserved by the econome-
trician. The productivity component can be further divided into a firm-
specific term (qjslt), a term common to all firms in a given industry (mst),
and a term common to all firms in a given locality (-lt). Equation (3) now
becomes
lnðYjsltÞ 5 b0 1 bL lnðLjsltÞ 1 bK lnðKjsltÞ 1 bM lnðMjsltÞ
1bHHjslt 1 mst 1 -lt 1 qjslt 1 vjslt:
(5)
One major difficulty in estimating bH in equation (5) is that nongood
firms may decide on their choice of H based on the realized firm-specific
productivity shock qjslt unknown to the researcher (for a discussion using
the first-order condition with respect toH obtained from the optimization
problem, see app. sec. A.I). To assess the relevance of this issue in my set-
ting, I present in Section V.A estimates using control function methods
drawn from the productivity literature (Olley and Pakes 1996; Levinsohn
and Petrin 2003). The Olley and Pakes (1996) approach addresses the issueThis content downloaded from 095.248.198.226 on April 25, 2019 09:33:36 AM
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Aof endogeneity of inputs by inverting the investment function to back out—
and thus control for—productivity. Specifically, the approach uses infor-
mation about observed investment to proxy for unobserved productivity
and applies a control function estimator. Olley and Pakes (1996) assume
that capital and the productivity shocks are firm-specific state variables in
the firm’s dynamic programming problem. Investment is chosen at time t
and adds to the capital stock at time t 1 1. The solution of the Bellman equa-
tion gives an investment policy function that depends on capital and pro-
ductivity. Labor inputs are not included in the investment equation because
they are assumed to be nondynamic inputs: they can be adjusted after real-
ization of the productivity shockwithin the same period. A key assumption
is that investment is strictly increasing in both capital stock and productiv-
ity. In addition, the productivity shock is assumed to be the only unobserv-
able driving the investment choice. Finally, when deciding on investment in
period t 1 1, any realizations of the productivity shock prior to time t are
not incorporated in the investment function because productivity evolves
by assumption following an exogenous first-order Markov process: a firm
builds expectations about its productivity at time t 1 1 exclusively based on
its productivity levels realized at time t. Therefore, one can assumemost gen-
erally that productivity evolves according to qjslt 5 gðqjslt21Þ 1 yjt, where yjt
is the random productivity shock. Provided the investment function is con-
tinuous in capital and qjslt and provided investment is positive, the invest-
ment equation can be inverted to yield qjslt 5 ft½ijslt, lnðKjsltÞ, where ijslt de-
notes firm j’s investment in physical capital at time t. Olley and Pakes
(1996) propose estimation based on a third-order polynomial series expan-
sion to approximate ft½ijslt, lnðKjsltÞ. Building onOlley and Pakes (1996), Le-
vinsohn and Petrin (2003) suggest the use of intermediate input demand in-
stead of investment demand as a proxy for productivity. This means that the
decision on intermediate input is made at time t once the productivity shock
is observed by the firm. The same applies to labor input choices, which in
turn means that labor and intermediate inputs are chosen at the same time
and labor inputs preserve their assumed nondynamic/flexible nature. In the
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) approach, intermediate inputs (electricity, ma-
terial inputs) are modeled as a function of the productivity shocks and cap-
ital similar to the use of investment in theOlley and Pakes (1996) procedure.
See Eberhardt and Helmers (2010) for a more in-depth discussion of these
structural estimators, and see SectionV.A for details on the estimation using
my data.Unobservable Future Shocks: Using the Number
of Downsizing Firms as the IV
It is also possible that knowledgeable workers are attracted to join firms
that are on the rise, rather than knowledgeable workersmoving tofirms andThis content downloaded from 095.248.198.226 on April 25, 2019 09:33:36 AM
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Acausing the increase in productivity. Specifically, the number of knowledge-
able workers may in principle also be correlated with productivity shocks
happening in the future if workers can foresee them and apply for jobs at
firmswith better growth prospects. If suchfirms prefer to hireworkers from
goodfirms, these workers will have a higher probability of being chosen. To
the extent that preferringworkers fromgoodfirms can be explained through
knowledge transfer from these firms, a positive correlation betweenH and
the receivingfirm’s productivity shocks in t 1 1 does suggest a role for labor
mobility as a channel for knowledge transfer, even though it will overesti-
mate its importance (Stoyanov and Zubanov 2012). To address this concern
in Section V.B, I present estimates instrumenting for the number of knowl-
edgeable workers in a nongood firm with the number of local good firms in
the same two-digit industry that downsized in the previous period. Follow-
ing a downsizing event at a good firm, it is more likely that a knowledgeable
worker applies for a job at local nongood firms because she is unemployed
and does not want to relocate far away. Put differently, in the scenario cap-
tured by the IV approach, the strategic mobility explanation is less likely to
play a role.
One can think of two main reasons why good firms may downsize in a
particular year. First, good firms may get a bad draw from the distribution
of product-market conditions. Even though an inherent productivity ad-
vantage partly insulates the goodfirms fromoutput shocks, sufficiently large
shockswill pierce this insulation and induce the goodfirm to lay offworkers.
Second, good firms may downsize in a particular year due to offshoring.
The basic intuition behind the IV approach is to consider moves from
workers whose former employer downsized due to demand shocks or off-
shoring.While the timing of thesemoves is arguably exogenous, thesework-
ers may still decide which new employer to join among the set of nongood
firms. However, in small labor markets and specialized industries, workers
may have a limited set of alternatives.17
The choice of the instrument is based on the notion that geographic prox-
imity plays an important role in determiningworkermobility. The evidence
from targeted interviews supports the idea that distance acts as a barrier for
job mobility. Moreover, in Section IV.B I show descriptive evidence re-
garding the propensity of workers to change jobs within the same LLM.
Notice that the number of downsizing local goodfirms is an external instru-
ment used in a production function framework. As pointed out in the sur-
vey byEberhardt andHelmers (2010), to date only past values of the regres-
sors themselves or input prices have been used for instrumentation in the
production function literature.17 The structure of the social network when the layoff occurs might predict
which firm a worker joins, but this research question is beyond the scope of the
current paper.
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AAlternative Approach: Proxy for Future Shocks
To explore the possibility of future productivity shocks further, I adapt
the Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) approaches
and control for (i) polynomial functions of capital and investment in both
t and t 1 1 and (ii) polynomial functions of capital and materials, again in
both t and t 1 1, in an effort to proxy for shocks that may be anticipated
by the workers. This is in the spirit of Stoyanov and Zubanov (2012) and
assumes that hiring firms are also able to anticipate their productivity
shocks and adjust their inputs accordingly. In Section V.A I provide the es-
timates and a longer discussion of such an approach. In Section V.C I also
provide estimates when including polynomial functions of capital, materi-
als, and the number of employees in both t and t 1 1. This specification is in
the spirit of the approach of Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer (2015).
2. Estimation of the Wage Model and Identification of Good Firms
Empirically, I identify potentially high-productivityfirms asHWFs:firms
that pay a relatively highfirm-specificwage premium. The use of alternative
groupings of firms based on output controlling for inputs and value added
yields very similar results (see Sec. V.C). The definition of high-productivity
firms as HWFs (employed in my baseline analysis) is consistent with many
recent models of frictional labor markets (e.g., Christensen et al. 2005), in
which higher-productivity firms pay higher wages for equivalent workers.
As I shall show below using balance sheet data, HWFs have significantly
higher TFP and value added than other firms in my sample. There are three
reasonswhy, for the baseline results, I use Social Security data to define good
firms asHWFs (rather than define the goodfirms directly as the high-TFP or
high-value-added ones and detect them using balance sheet data). First, So-
cial Security data are available for a longer period of time than the balance
sheets, and therefore their use allows amore accurate categorization offirms.
Second, since Social Security records are administrative data, measurement
error is lower than in balance sheets. Third, Social Security data allow esti-
mation of a worker-level wage equation, controlling formeasured individual
characteristics and worker effects. The estimated worker effects will also be
helpful later in order to characterize knowledgeable workers and investigate
the issue of unobserved labor qualitywhen evaluating the productivity effect
of labor mobility (Sec. V.C).
Following Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999), I specify a loglinear
statistical model of wages, as follows:
wijt 5 vi 1 wj 1 X0itb 1 εijt, (6)
where the dependent variable, the log of the average daily wage earned by
worker i in firm j in year t, is expressed as a function of individual hetero-This content downloaded from 095.248.198.226 on April 25, 2019 09:33:36 AM
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Ageneity, firm heterogeneity, and measured time-varying characteristics.18
The presence of labor mobility in matched worker-firm data sets (like the
one I use) enables the identification of worker and firm effects. A concern
for estimation arises from the possibility of mobility based on the value of
worker-firm match. See appendix section A.III for a detailed discussion
and the results of the analyses I perform to test for such sorting.
For the baseline analysis, I identify good firms as those whose estimated
firm fixed effects fall within the top third of all estimated firm effects. Sec-
tion IV.A reports descriptive results as well as more details on the estima-
tion procedure. In what follows, I use “HWFs” and “good firms” inter-
changeably. Results are very similar if I identify good firms as those whose
estimated firm fixed effects fall within the top third of the estimated firm ef-
fects within industry. In Section V.D I remove the top-third threshold and
employ a continuous measure of the receiving firm’s exposure to knowl-
edge. This alternative measure is the difference in quality between the send-
ing and the receiving firm defined for each new worker i hired from more
productive firms than the receiving firm j, multiplied by the number of such
workers in j. The larger the value, the higher the exposure of the receiving
firm to the knowledge coming from the sending firms. This procedure ex-
tends the baseline analysis, which works with a dummy indicating experi-
ence at a good firm.
IV. Data and Descriptive Statistics
The data used in this paper covers the region of Veneto, an administrative
region in the northeast of Italy with a population of around 5million people
(8% of the country’s total). During the period of analysis (1992–2001), the
labor market in Veneto has been characterized by nearly full employment, a
positive rate of job creation in manufacturing, and positive migration flows
(Tattara and Valentini 2010). The dynamic regional economy features a large
presence of flexible firms, frequently organized in districts with a level of in-
dustrial value added greatly exceeding the national average.19 Manufacturing
firms in Veneto specialize inmetal engineering, goldsmithing, plastics, furni-
ture, garments, textiles, leather, and shoes.20 The manufacture of food and
beverage—wine and baked goods, in particular—is also a prominent sub-
sector.18 The vectorX0it includes tenure, tenure squared, age, age squared, a dummy var-
iable for manager and white-collar status, and interaction terms between gender and
other individual characteristics.
19 See Whitford (2001) for a discussion. The most famous industrial concentra-
tion is the eyewear district in the province of Belluno, where Luxottica, the world’s
largest manufacturer of eyeglasses, has production plants.
20 Benetton, Sisley, Geox, Diesel, and Replay are Veneto brands.
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AMy data set pools three sources of information: individual earnings rec-
ords, firm balance sheets, and information on LLMs.21 The earnings rec-
ords come from the Veneto Workers History (VWH) data set. The VWH
has data on all private sector personnel in the Veneto region. Specifically,
it contains register-based information for virtually any job lasting at least
one day. A complete employment history has been reconstructed for each
worker.
Balance sheets starting from1995were obtained fromAnalisi Informatiz-
zata delle Aziende (AIDA), a database circulated by Bureau Van Dijk con-
taining official records of all incorporated nonfinancial Italian firms with
annual revenues of at least €500,000. AIDA’s balance sheets include each
firm’s location, revenues, total wage bill, the book value of capital (broken
into subgroups), value added, number of employees, value of materials, and
industry code. I use firm identifiers to match job-year observations for
workers aged 16–64 in the VWH with firm financial data in AIDA for the
period 1995–2001. Further details on the match and data restrictions I make
as well as descriptive information are provided in appendix section A.II.
Information on LLMs is obtained from the National Institute of Statis-
tics. The LLMs are territorial groupings of municipalities characterized by
a certain degree of working-day commuting by the resident population. In
1991 the 518municipalities (or comuni) in Veneto are divided into 51 LLMs.
To bolster the analysis, in January 2012 I visited several Veneto firms and
interviewed employees about the history of their enterprises and their cur-
rent operations. In the following years I have also conducted targeted inter-
views (via phone and email) with academic and industry experts as well as
officials of chambers of commerce.
A. Abowd-Kramarz-Margolis (AKM) Estimation
and Descriptive Statistics
This section reports descriptive results for the firms in my sample as well
as more details on the AKM estimation procedure. The method in Abowd,
Creecy, andKramarz (2002) identifies separate groups ofworkers andfirms
that are connected via labor mobility in matched employer-employee data.
When a group ofworkers andfirms is connected, the group contains all per-
sons who ever worked for any firm within the group and all firms at which
any of the persons were ever employed. I run the grouping algorithm sep-
arately using VWH data from 1992 to 2000 for firms that could be matched
in AIDA.22 I then use the created group variable to choose the largest group21 The first two sources, combined for the period 1995–2001, have been used in
the study on rent sharing, hold up, and wages by Card, Devicienti, and Maida
(2014).
22 I experimented with other choices for the period of the AKM estimation, such
as 1991–2000 and 1992–1999. Results are very similar.
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reas a sample for my fixed effects estimation—equation (6). Details on sample
restrictions and descriptive information are provided in appendix section A.II.
I identify HWFs as those firms whose firm effects rank in the top third
of the sample. Column 1 of table 1 shows that HWFs pay on average 13%
higher wages than non-HWFs.23 For labormobility to generate productivity
benefits, a firm-specific advantage should be observed at good firms that
could be the basis for knowledge transfer to other local firms. I therefore es-
timate equations such as
lnOjslt 5 b0 1 b1HWFj 1 mst 1 -lt 1 controlsjt 1 ejslt, (7)
where the dummy HWF takes the value of 1 if firm j is classified as high
wage during the period 1992–2000 (the years over which the AKM esti-
mates are obtained) and Ojst represents different firm-level outcomes over
the period 1995–2001 (the years overwhich balance sheet data are available).
The different firm-level outcomes are TFP (output as the dependent vari-
able, controlling for capital, materials, and labor inputs), value added, cap-
ital intensity (fixed assets as the dependent variable, controlling for firm
size), and intangible capital intensity (intangible fixed assets—intellectual
property, accumulated research and development investments, and good-
will—as the dependent variable, controlling for firm size). Columns 2–5 of
table 1 show the results. In the Venetomanufacturing sector clear differences
betweenHWFs and non-HWFs emerge:HWFs feature on average 8%higher
TFP, 11%higher value added, 10%higher capital intensity, and 27%higher
intangible capital intensity. This evidence is important for establishing the
potential for knowledge transfer in the region.able 1
haracteristics of High-Wage Firms (HWFs)
Individual Wage
(1)
TFP
(2)
Value Added
(3)
K
(4)
Intangible K
(5)
WF .130 .080 .105 .101 .274
(.003) (.008) (.010) (.025) (.043)
bservations 1,837,597 26,657 26,587 26,674 24,450
djusted R2 .912 .920 .800 .496 .21023 This finding eme
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AB. Labor Mobility and Characteristics of Knowledgeable Workers
For labor mobility to be a mechanism for transfer of knowledge, wemust
observe some workers moving from HWFs to other firms. This section
documents the extent of labor mobility between HWFs and non-HWFs
from 1992 to 2001. For this period, I observe around 62,000 incidents of
job change. These moves are categorized according to the direction of the
flows in tableA3 (tables A1–A12 are available online). Column 1 shows that
around 7,700 of these moves are from HWFs to non-HWFs. Columns 2
and 3 distinguish between moves within and moves across LLMs. They
show that moves within the same LLM happen more frequently.24 Col-
umns 4 and 5 distinguish between moves within and moves between two-
digit industries. Around 35% of the moves from HWFs to non-HWFs are
within the same industry. The remaining moves are to a non-HWF in one
of the 19 two-digit industries other than the one in which the worker has
HWF experience.
Table A4 shows the share of knowledgeable workers in non-HWFs
(col. 1) and the share of non-HWFs employing knowledgeable workers,
that is, firmswithH > 0 (col. 2). The proportion of knowledgeable workers
in non-HWFs is defined as the number of knowledgeable workers observed
at non-HWFs divided by the total number of workers in the Veneto region
employed by non-HWFs (i.e., employees at non-HWFs with H 5 0 or
H > 0). In 1995, only 0.5%of the total employees in non-HWFs had recent
HWF experience. In 2001, this share doubled to 1%. In terms of the poten-
tial for knowledge transfer, the relevant question is how knowledgeable
workers spread across the sample of non-HWFs. The share of firms em-
ploying knowledgeable workers is much greater than the share of such
workers: around 18% in 1995 and around 29% in 2001.
Overall, I observe 6,539 unique knowledgeable workers. With regard to
individual characteristics of the movers in my sample, table A5 shows that
knowledgeable workers observed at non-HWF tend to be more likely to be
male, white collar, and managers than non-HWF workers without recent
experience at good firms.25 For a comparison of the distribution of the es-
timated vi, see Section V.III.
V. Evidence on Worker Flows and Productivity
In this section I evaluate the extent towhich non-HWFs benefit from hir-
ing workers from HWFs during the period 1995–2001. Details on sample
restrictions and descriptive statistics for the variables used in the regression
analysis are provided in appendix section A.II.24 In app. sec. A.IV I further discuss the relation between geography and labor
mobility.
25 In terms of months of HWF experience, the minimum is 11 months, and the
mean is 32 months.
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AA. Estimates Using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
and Control Function Methods
Table 2 shows the estimation results using OLS and control function
methods. I cluster standard errors at the firm level. Coefficients associated
with theH variable in table 2 represent semielasticities because my variable
of interest is not in logarithms. This choice for the baseline specification,
which directly follows from equation (2), is founded on the fact thatH takes
the value of 0 for a large number of observations (fig. 1). Thus, any possible
transformation of the H measure could possibly affect the associated esti-
mated parameters.26 Column 1 reports estimates from the baseline OLS
specification: the coefficient onHjst is positive (0.03) and significant. In col-
umns 2 and 3, I use the Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin
(2003) control function methods in order to address potential endogeneity
arising from unobservable productivity shocks. In implementing these con-
trol function approaches, I treatHjst as a freely variable input (recall the dis-
cussion in Sec. III.B.1).27 Although the point estimates of the coefficients for
Hjst in the Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) specifi-
cations are smaller than the baseline estimate, none of the specifications is
qualitatively inconsistent with the empirical finding that non-HWFs bene-
fit from hiring workers from HWFs.
The extent to which non-HWFs benefit from hiring workers fromHWFs
may be overestimated in columns 1–3 in the presence of productivity shocks
happening in the future if workers can foresee them and apply for jobs in
firms with better growth prospects (as discussed in Sec. III.B.1). In Sec-
tion V.B I show results from the IV strategy. Columns 4 and 5 of table 2
show the estimates from an alternative approach to address the issue of fu-
ture productivity shocks: I add polynomial functions of capital and invest-
ments or capital and materials in t and t 1 1. These estimates also suggest26 Results using different functional forms are discussed in Sec. V.C.
27 I use the opreg Stata routine developed by Yasar, Raciborski, and Poi (2008),
and I use the levpet Stata routine developed by Petrin, Poi, and Levinsohn (2004),
respectively. I do not observe investment, and hence for col. 2 of table 2 I derived a
proxy variable in t as the difference between the reported book value of capital at
time t 1 1 and its value in t. The way I constructed the proxy variable somehow
exacerbates the measurement error problems typically associated with the proxy
variable approach. In addition, augmenting my specification with this proxy vari-
able reduces my sample size substantially, as (i) many firm-year observations are
lost when I take the difference in reported book values and (ii) the Olley and Pakes
(1996) approach requires positive values for the proxy variable, eliminating addi-
tional firm-year observations (the estimation routine will truncate firms’ nonpositive
proxy variable observations because the monotonicity condition necessary to invert
the investment function—and hence back out productivity—does not hold for these
observations).
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Athat non-HWFs benefit from knowledgeable workers by experiencing in-
creased productivity.28
Overall, themain empirical result discussed so far is that non-HWFs ben-
efit from hiring workers from HWFs. The point estimates suggest that the
average effect of recruiting a knowledgeable worker on a non-HWF’s pro-
ductivity is an increase between 1.8% and 3%. In interpretingmy estimates,
it is important to highlight that non-HWFs are quite small: the median
number of employees at non-HWFs is 33. Furthermore, as many as 78%
of non-HWFs in a given year do not employ any knowledgeable workers.
Hiring one knowledgeable worker therefore implies a significant change in
terms of workforce for most firms in my data. It may also be instructive to
evaluate the average magnitude of TFP change in monetary terms. Multi-
plying the estimated percentage change by the mean value of non-HWF
output suggests that the increase in TFP due to hiring a worker fromHWFs
leads to an increase in total output of €154,000–€256,000 (in 2000 euros).29Table 2
Knowledgeable Workers and Productivity in Non-High-Wage Firms
(Non-HWFs), 1995–2001
OLS
(1)
OP
(2)
LP
(3)
Investment-Capital
Interactions in
t, t 1 1
(4)
Materials-Capital
Interactions in
t, t 1 1
(5)
log(capital) .092 .087 .148
(.005) (.019) (.010)
log(materials) .583 .587 .617
(.007) (.007) (.012)
log(employees) .223 .225 .202 .187 .177
(.006) (.010) (.006) (.014) (.006)
H workers .030 .018 .021 .018 .022
(.003) (.004) (.003) (.006) (.003)
[.003] [.006] [.003]
Observations 17,158 6,635 17,158 2,963 13,540
Adjusted R2 .931 .940 .95228 That said, many
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In this section, I instrument for the number of knowledgeable workers in
a nongood firm by using the number of good firms in the same LLM and
same two-digit industry that downsized in the previous period. This IV
strategy aims to address the concern of strategic mobility whereby workers
may be attracted to join firms that are on the rise. Turning to the details of
the instrument, a firm is defined as a downsizing firm if its employment de-
creased by more than 1% compared with the previous year’s level. The di-
vision of good firms into downsizing and nondownsizing firms according
to this criterion is less sensible for small firms. Thus, I impose the additional
condition that the decrease in employment is greater than or equal to three
individuals.30 In the presence of product demand shocks or offshoring, us-
ing the number of downsizing firms as an instrument is invalid if it cannotIG. 1.—Distribution of H (number of knowledgeable workers) across firms.
n are the number of knowledgeable workers observed at non-high-wage
s. Firm-year observations are for the period 1995–2001. I define a worker as
ng recent high-wage firm (HWF) experience in year t if he or she is observed
king in a HWF for one or more of the years t 2 3 to t 2 1. If a worker is hired
e t 2 g and has experience at a HWF between t 2 g and t 2 3, he or she con-
tes to theH count from year t 2 g until t. A color version of this figure is avail-
online.an average firm. Parrotta and Pozzoli (2012) find the impact of the recruitment of
knowledge carriers on a firm’s value added is an increase of 1%–2%. Balsvik (2011)
finds that workers with multinational enterprise experience contribute 20% more
to the productivity of their plant than workers without such experience.
30 The IV is summarized in table A7, together with other variables constructed at
the LLM level that are used in the analysis.
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Abe excluded from themodel of interest (eq. [3]). The identifying assumption
of my IV strategy is therefore that the number of downsizing good firms is
correlated with the variable of interest,H, but uncorrelated with any other
unobserved determinants of productivity. As in the above (and in the re-
mainder of the paper), regressions include industry-year interaction dum-
mies and LLM-year interaction dummies. The term cbHIV is biased upward
if there are localized unobservable industry shocks that would lead good
firms to downsize and at the same time positively affect productivity at
non-HWFs. But the IV estimates may also be downward biased because
of correlated shocks (at the LLM-by-industry level) that lead some local
good firms to downsize and at the same time lead to productivity declines
in non-HWFs. I discuss in detail my investigation of possible violations of
the exclusion restriction below.
Table 3 shows the results from the IV estimation of equation (3).31
The estimated coefficient ofH, the number of knowledgeable workers, in
column 1 is large (0.143). Recall theOLS estimates: the coefficient on knowl-
edgeable workers is 0.03. A possible explanation for the magnitude of the
IV results is that in normal times workers who leave good firms may be
more peripheral workers. However, when a firm is downsizing even its core
or key workers may have to leave, and these workers may have to go to
worse firms (whereas if they would leave in normal times, they might go
to other HWFs). Workers who move to non-HWFs due to downsizing of
a HWF may therefore embody more knowledge than workers who shift
in general.32 Another, more tentative explanation for the magnitude of the
IV results is that the effect of knowledgeable workersmay be heterogeneous
across firms. If there are indeed heterogeneous effects ofH on productivity,
then consistent OLSmeasures the average effect ofH on productivity across
all firms. Two-stage least squares (2SLS), on the other hand, estimates the
average effect for the firms that are marginal in the recruitment decision,
in the sense that they recruit knowledgeable workers if and only if there ex-
ists excess local supply.33 If the effect of knowledgeable workers on produc-
tivity is larger for non-HWFs that are marginal in the recruitment decision,
the 2SLS estimates will exceed those of consistent OLS.34 In practice, how-31 Standard errors are clustered at the level of the LLM.
32 As for observable worker characteristics, in results untabulated here I have ex-
plored whether knowledgeable workers from downsizing firms come from more
high-skilled occupations. I failed to find any significant differences between the
two groups.
33 See Imbens and Angrist (1994) for a discussion. For a recent example, see
Eisensee and Strömberg (2007).
34 In results not tabulated here, I have explored whether non-HWFs hiring
knowledgeable workers from downsizing HWFs differ in terms of observable
characteristics from non-HWFs hiring knowledgeable workers in general. Specifi-
cally I have performed t-tests of equality of means for the levels of capital per worker,
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Aever, the IV standard errors are quite large (0.067) and prevent me from
drawing definitive conclusions.35
It is also important to emphasize that downsizing of a good firm is not a
likely event. In Section VI I evaluate the extent to which labor mobility can
explain the productivity advantages of firms located near other highly pro-
ductivefirms. Those calculations take into account the probability of down-
sizing and therefore deliver a similar conclusion when using either the OLS
or the IV estimate of bH to study the extent to which worker flows explain
the productivity gains experienced by incumbent firms when new highly
productive firms are added to a LLM.
A concern for the validity of the exclusion restriction arises from the ob-
servation that the dependent variable in my econometric model is the valueable 3
nowledgeable Workers and Productivity in Non-High-Wage Firms
on-HWFs), Instrumental Variable (IV) Estimates, 1995–2001
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Aof output.36 Unobserved shifts in local demand from the products of HWFs
to the products of non-HWFs might simultaneously lead to a downsizing
byHWFs, higher output prices for non-HWFs, and the hiring ofHWF em-
ployees by non-HWFs. The LLM-year effects control for local demand
shocks, but localized unobservable industry shocks may still play a role.
Consequently, it is possible thatcbHIV > 0 reflects higher output prices rather
than higher productivity due to labor mobility. I do not expect this to be a
major factor in my study: manufacturing firms in my sample generally pro-
duce goods traded outside the LLM.37 To explore this possibility further, I
add a dummy in column 2 taking the value of 1 if the industry produces
goods that are not widely traded outside the LLM.38 The results are largely
unchanged.39
Finally, in column 3 I use an alternative definition of downsizing firms: a
downsizing firm must see an employment reduction larger than 3% com-
pared with the previous year’s level. The results are again largely unchanged.
Overall, the estimates suggest that the productivity effect of labor mobility
is at least in part independent of unobserved future productivity shocks that
are correlated with the propensity to hire workers with experience at highly
productive firms.
C. Validity and Robustness
The main empirical result so far for the firm-level analysis is that non-
HWFs appear to benefit from hiring workers from HWFs. I now investi-
gate the robustness of the estimates to various specifications and explore
several possible alternative explanations for the estimated effects.
1. Unobserved Worker Quality
As mentioned above, a potential threat to identification is the fact that I
do not observe worker quality. To investigate this issue, figure 2 shows a
plot of the quantiles of the distribution of bvi 0s, the worker fixed effects ob-36 The theoretically correct dependent variable in a productivity study is the
quantity of output, but due to data limitations this study (and most of the empirical
literature on productivity in a large sample of firms) uses price multiplied by quan-
tity.
37 Imagine the extreme case of a non-HWF that produces a nationally traded
good in a perfectly competitive industry. Its output prices would not increase dis-
proportionately if the LLM experienced an increased demand for its good.
38 See app. sec. A.V for details.
39 In results untabulated here, I have included an interaction between the dummy
for local industry and H: the coefficient on the interaction is not significant (coef-
ficient: 0.376; standard error: 0.428). I have also run separate IV regressions in the
groups of tradable and nontradable industries: while in the first subsample the es-
timates are very similar to the baseline IV specification on the full sample (col. 1 of
table 3), in the second, much smaller subsample (706 observations) b^H is positive
but smaller and not significant (coefficient: 0.057; standard error: 0.215).
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Atained from estimating equation (6), for unknowledgeable workers (work-
ers at HWFs with no experience at good firms) against the quantiles of the
distribution of bvi 0s’s for the switchers from good firms. Points on the right-
hand side of the 457 line mean that the values of the distribution on the X-
axis are higher than those of the distribution on the Y-axis.40 Since many
points are on the left-hand side of the main diagonal, it seems reasonable
to conclude that workers coming to non-HWFs fromHWFs are (to a large
extent) not positively selected on unobserved ability. Below I revisit this
question in a regression framework and again conclude that the productiv-
ity effect of knowledgeable workers does not appear to be driven by unob-
served worker quality.
2. Unobservables Related with New Hires
If workers who recently changed firms are more productive than stayers,
the effect of newly hired workers with HWF experience may equally apply
to newly hired employees without HWF experience. Also, the estimatedFIG. 2.—Quantile-quantile plot: worker effects. Shown is a quantile-quantile
plot of worker effects in 1995. Plots for all other years are very similar. HWF p
high-wage firm; non-HWFp non-high-wage firm. A color version of this figure
is available online.40 Both axes are in units of the estimated vi from eq. (6) (vertical axis for unknowl-
edgeable workers and horizontal axis for the hires from good firms). For a given
point on the quantile-quantile plot, the quantile level is the same for both points.
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Aproductivity gains may be driven by better worker-firm matching rather
than knowledge transfer. To explore these possibilities, I first define medium-
wage firms (MWFs) as those whose estimated firm fixed effects from the
AKM model fall between the 33th percentile and the 67th percentile of all
estimated firm effects and low-wage firms (LWFs) as those whose estimated
firm fixed effects fall below the bottom third. I then construct a new vari-
able, denoted by N: the number of new hires that do not have HWF expe-
rience. I then estimate for the sample of MWFs
ln Ymsltð Þ 5 b0 1 bL ln Lmsltð Þ 1 bK ln Kmsltð Þ 1 bM ln Mmsltð Þ
1bHHmslt 1 bNNmslt 1 mst 1 -lt 1 vmslt:
In this specification, the identification of knowledge transfer relies on the
differential effect of hiring an employee with recent HWF experience over
hiring an employee from a LWF. By including bothH andN, any potential
bias caused by the correlation between unobservables and new hires is re-
moved. Column 1 of table 4 shows the results. The coefficient onH is pos-
itive and significant. The coefficient onN is positive but much smaller. The
difference in productivity premiums associated with the two types of newly
hired workers is significant at the 1% level. The introduction of N, in the
spirit of Balsvik (2011), can also be seen as a placebo test at the firm level.
It suggests that the productivity effect attributed to knowledgeable workers
is not associated with recently hired workers in general: large productivity
gains from hiring seem to be realized only when new hires come fromHWFs.
While I cannot completely rule out the possibility that at least someof the es-
timated effect reflects better worker-firmmatching or switchers being more
productive than stayers in general (i.e., regardless of the previous employ-
ment history), this evidence lends credibility to the knowledge transfer hy-
pothesis.41
3. Within Estimates and an Event Study Analysis
Next, in column 2 of table 4 I show estimates using the within transfor-
mation in order to explore the possibility that the estimated productivity
gains are due to time-invariant unobservables. This would be the case, for
instance, if the (long-run) stable hiring patterns are due to certain manage-
ment practices (Stoyanov and Zubanov 2012). The estimates in column 2
should be interpreted cautiously because thewithin estimator is known from
practical experience to perform poorly in the context of production func-41 In results untabulated here, I have checked how workers from LWFs are se-
lected compared with other workers at MWFs. Looking at quantile-quantile plots
of worker effects, there is no evidence of systematic selection. In some years t-tests
of equality of means show evidence that workers from LWFs come from higher-
skilled occupations.
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(2tions (Eberhardt and Helmers 2010).42 The problem of using the within
transformation is the removal of considerable information from the data,
since only variation over time is left to identify the parameters. If this con-
cern is set aside, the results show a positive and significant coefficient onH.
A potential issue in evaluating the relationship between the number of
knowledgeable workers and TFP arises from the possibility of differential
pretrends. Moreover there may be some interesting posthiring dynamics
that are not captured by the above estimation procedures. I therefore turn
to an event-study research design as inKline (2011) andAutor (2003), whose
exposition I follow here.
Specifically, the regression equation is
lnðYjsltÞ 5 b0 1 bL lnðLjsltÞ 1 bK lnðKjsltÞ 1 bM lnðMjsltÞ
1o
t
btDtjt 1 mst 1 -lt 1 lj 1 ujslt,
(8)able 4
nowledgeable Workers and Productivity in Non-High-Wage Firms
on-HWFs): Additional Specifications Addressing Endogeneity Concerns
Experience
HWFs/LWFs
(1)
Within
(2)
Workforce
Characteristics
(3)
Materials-Capital-Labor
Interactions in t, t 1 1
(4)
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(.007) (.005) (.005)
g(materials) .585 .596 .573
(.011) (.013) (.007)
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(.009) (.004) (.006)
workers .022 .010 .029 .012
(.004) (.002) (.003) (.003)
ecent LWF experience .003
(.002)
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~N , p-value .000
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H workers” is the number of knowledgeable workers currently observed at non-HWFs. Column 1 is es-
mated on the sample of medium-wage firms and includes workers with recent experience at high-wage
rms (HWFs) and low-wage firms (LWFs). “bHWF~H 5 b
LWF
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, p-value” is the p-value of the equality of coef-
cients of the variable “Recent HWF experience” and the variable “Recent LWF experience.”Column 2 reports
ithin estimates. Column 3 adds the shares of managers, white-collar workers, blue-collar workers, female
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Awhere the Dtjt are a sequence of event-time dummies that equal 1 when the
hire is t years away (t may be negative). Formally,
Dtjt ; I½t 2 ej 5 t,
where I[.] is an indicator function for the expression in brackets being true
and ej is the year of the hire. Therefore, the b t coefficients characterize the
time path of TFP relative to the date of the event for hiring non-HWFs, con-
ditional on the unobserved variance components mst, vlt, lj, and ujslt. If the
hire is not, on average, preceded by trends in firm-specific TFP, the follow-
ing restriction should hold:
bt 5 08t < 0:
The results are obtained by estimating equation (8) by OLS and adding a
set of event-time dummies prior to and after the hire, together with firm,
industry-year, and LLM-year fixed effects. Specifically, I add dummies for 3
and 2 years before the hire, years 0–2 after the hire, and year 3 forward (I nor-
malize the first lead—i.e.,21 in event time—to zero). Of these six dummies,
note that the first five are equal to 1 only in the relevant period, while the
final dummy variable for year 3 forward equals 1 in each period beginning
with the third year after the event.
Column 1 of table A8 reports the estimated bt coefficients, comparing
changes in the TFP of firms that hire a knowledgeable worker with both
the TFP of firms that have not yet hired a knowledgeable worker and the
TFP offirms that will never hire a knowledgeable worker duringmy sample
period. Figure 3 plots the coefficients. There is no clear pretreatment trend
in the coefficients but an upward break in the TFP of non-HWFs after the
hire of a knowledgeable worker.43 Estimates with linear firm-specific time
trends (displayed in col. 2) are qualitatively similar to the baseline ones.
4. Additional Specifications Addressing Endogeneity Concerns
Considering the differences in observable characteristics documented
in Section IV.B between movers from HWFs and other workers at non-
HWFs, in column 3 of table 4 I augment equation (3) with the share of fe-
males, managers, blue-collar and white-collar workers, and differently aged
workers at each firm. The estimate of b H in column 3 is in line with the re-
sults from table 2.
In column 4, I include polynomial functions of capital, materials, and the
number of employees in both t and t 1 1. This specification is in the spirit of43 In results untabulated here, I have confirmed that the estimates are similar
when estimating the econometric model in col. 1 without the non-HWFs that never
hire, thus exploiting only the differential timing of arrival of a knowledgeable
worker among the non-HWFs that hire.
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of table 4, together with the IV results and the estimates in columns 4 and 5
of table 2, indicate that the productivity effect of labor mobility is at least in
part independent of unobserved future productivity shocks that are corre-
lated with the propensity to hire workers with experience at highly produc-
tive firms.
5. Alternative Groupings of Firms
As an additional sensitivity check, I classify potential good firms as firms
with high TFP. Specifically, I estimate firm effects from a TFP specification
(i.e., one inwhich the dependent variable is output, and I control for inputs).
I identify good firms as those whose estimated firm fixed effects fall within
the top third of all estimated firm effects. The results, shown in table A9, are
very similar to those in table 2. I also experimented with a grouping of firms
based on the estimated firm fixed effects in a value-added specification. Re-
sults were largely unchanged.FIG. 3.—Productivity of non-high-wage firms relative to the year of the hire of a
knowledgeable worker. The figure plots point estimates for leading and lagging in-
dicators for the hire of a knowledgeable worker. Event time indicator “13” set to 1
for all periods 3 periods after the event and 0 otherwise. The omitted category is 1
period prior to the event. Vertical bars correspond to 95% confidence intervals
with firm-clustered standard errors. TFP 5 total factor productivity. A color ver-
sion of this figure is available online.This content downloaded from 095.248.198.226 on April 25, 2019 09:33:36 AM
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A6. Additional Robustness Checks
Table A10 shows results from further robustness checks. In column 1, I
show that estimates when using value added as an alternative dependent var-
iable are qualitatively similar. Columns 2–5 investigate the role of functional
form assumptions. Until now, I have presented results based on specifica-
tions where the intensity of potential knowledge transferred is measured
by the number ofHworkers. In column 2, Imodel this intensity as the share
of workers with recent experience at good firms, dividingH by L.44 In col-
umn 3, I estimate
ln Yjslt
 
5 b0 1 bL ln Ljslt
 
1 bK ln Kjslt
 
1bM ln Mjslt
 
1 bHl log Hjslt
 
1 d1 Hjslt 5 0Þjslt 1 mst 1 -lt 1 vjslt:

Compared with equation (3), I replaced Hjslt with its logarithm, and I im-
posed logðHjsltÞ 5 0 for the observations with Hjslt 5 0. Plus, I added the
dummy 1ðH 5 0Þjslt, which takes a value of 1 if the number of knowledge-
able workers is equal to zero.
Column 4 allows the effect of each input to vary at the two-digit industry
level. This specification accounts for the possibility that different industries
use different technology or employ inputs of different quality. In column 5,
inputs are modeled with the translog functional form. My findings are ro-
bust to the different functional form assumptions in columns 2–5.
7. Quality of the Sending Firm and Quality of the Worker
In table 5 I extend the specification in column 1 of table 4 by estimating
separate coefficients for (i) high-quality knowledgeable workers (bHWF,h~H ),
(ii) low-quality knowledgeable workers (bHWF,l~H ), (iii) high-quality hires that
do not have HWF experience (bLWF,h~N ), and (iv) low-quality hires that do not
have HWF experience (bLWF,l~N ). In column 1 quality is measured in terms of
past occupation. The difference between bHWF,h~H and b
LWF,h
~N is significant at
the 1% level; that between bHWF,l~H and b
LWF,l
~N is significant at 10%. In column 2
quality is measured in terms of preestimated worker fixed effect. The differ-
ence between bHWF,h~H and b
LWF,h
~N is again significant at the 1% level; that be-
tween bHWF,l~H and b
LWF,l
~N , while positive, is not significant.44 Since there may be measurement error in L, the number of employees in the
AIDA data, a potential problem with such specification arises. Rewrite eq. (3) as
lnðYjst=vLjstÞ5 bK lnðKjstÞ 1 bM lnðMjstÞ 1 bhhjst 1 mst 1 -lt 1 vjslt. Since h5H=L,
a mechanical relationship between h and the dependent variable may arise at time t.
To address this issue, I use L obtained from head counts in the Social Security data
set.
This content downloaded from 095.248.198.226 on April 25, 2019 09:33:36 AM
ll use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
000 Serafinelli
AD. Further Firm-Level Results
1. Results for Labor Mobility Within and Between Industry Sectors
An interesting question is whether the knowledge embedded in workers
is general enough to be applied in different industries: column 1 of table 6
distinguishes between workers with HWF experience moving within the
same two-digit industry and workers moving between industries. The co-
efficient on both types of knowledgeable workers moving is significant
and positive. This is consistent with knowledge transfer by labor mobility
being able to overcome technology borders between industries.
2. Results by Worker Occupation
I now investigate whether the occupation of new hires influences the
strength of the effect of knowledgeable workers on the receiving firm’s pro-
ductivity. I consider heterogeneity in knowledgeable workers’ occupation
bothwithin their sending (good) and receiving (nongood)firms. Specifically,
knowledgeable workers are grouped into higher-skilled and lower-skilled
occupations. The higher-skilled occupation category includes white-collar
workers and managers. The lower-skilled occupation includes blue-collar
workers and apprentices.
In column 2 of table 6, the main variable of interest is disaggregated into
two groups based on the occupation at the previous employer (HWF). In
column 3 it is disaggregated based on the occupation at the current employer
(non-HWF). By and large, the estimates are consistent with the hypothesis
that workers in higher-skilled occupations are better able to transfer knowl-Table 5
Knowledgeable Workers with Experience at High-Wage Firms (HWFs)
versus Low-Wage Firms (LWFs): Separating Higher- and Lower-
Skilled Workers
Previous Occupation
(1)
Worker Fixed Effect
(2)
H workers, higher skilled .035 .030
(.007) (.006)
Recent LWF experience, higher skilled .009 .006
(.005) (.003)
H workers, lower skilled .012 .008
(.005) (.005)
Recent LWF experience, lower skilled .001 .002
(.003) (.004)
H0: bHWF,h~H 5 b
LWF,h
~N , p-value .005 .001
H0: bHWF,l~H 5 b
LWF,l
~N , p-value .077 .473This content downloaded from 0
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Aedge. In both columns, coefficients on both variables are positive and signif-
icant, but the point estimate on the productivity effect is larger for switchers
in higher-skilled occupations, with the differential impact being significant at
conventional levels.
3. Continuous Measure of the Receiving Firm’s
Exposure to New Knowledge
In column 4 of table 6, I employ a continuous measure of the receiving
firm’s exposure to knowledge, drawn from Stoyanov and Zubanov (2012),Table 6
Knowledgeable Workers and Productivity in Non-High-Wage Firms
(Non-HWFs), Further Extensions, 1995–2001
Same/Different
Industry
(1)
Previous
Occupation
(2)
Current
Occupation
(3)
Continuous
Measure
(4)
Lag
(5)
H from same industry .035
(.006)
H from different industry .028
(.004)
H current higher-skilled
occupation .042
(.006)
H current lower-skilled
occupation .025
(.004)
H previous higher-skilled
occupation .044
(.006)
H previous lower-skilled
occupation .025
(.004)
Exposure .026
(.013)
Lag (H workers) .024
(.005)
bsameH 5 b
diff
H , p-value .232
b
high
H 5 b
low
H , p-value .013 .006
Observations 17,158 17,158 17,158 17,158 16,265
Adjusted R2 .931 .931 .931 .931 .932This content 
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the current employer (non-HWF). “bhighH 5 b
low
H , p-value” is the p-value of the equality of coefficients of the
H workers in higher-skilled occupations and the H workers in lower-skilled occupations. In col. 4, I em-
ploy an alternative, continuous measure of the receiving firm’s exposure to knowledge, which exploits the
differences between sending and receiving firms, thus extending the analysis above which has so far worked
with a dummy indicating experience at a HWF (see the main text for details on the definition of this var-
iable). In col. 5, the variable of interest is lagged by 1 year. AM
chicago.edu/t-and-c).
000 Serafinelli
Athat exploits the differences between sending and receiving firms. This pro-
cedure extends the analysis above,which uses a dummy indicating experience
at a HWF. The new measure of a firm’s exposure to knowledge is calculated
for each firm j hiring at time t as follows:
exposurej,t 5 o
Gj,t
i51
Di,t w^si 2 w^rj
    Gj,t,
where w^si and w^rj are the estimated AKM firm effects of the sending and re-
ceiving firms,Gj,t is the number of newworkers, andDi,t is an indicator var-
iable equal to 1 if ðw^si 2 w^rj Þ > 0 and 0 otherwise; the newmeasure is the dif-
ference in quality between the sending and the receiving firm defined for
each new worker i hired frommore productive firms than the receiving firm j,
multiplied by the number of such workers in j. The larger the value, the higher
the exposure of the receiving firm to the knowledge coming from the sending
firms. The estimates confirm that non-HWFs benefit from hiring workers
from HWFs.45
4. Lagged Number of Knowledgeable Workers
In column 5 of table 6, I lag the number of workers with HWF experi-
ence. The coefficient is again positive and significant.
5. Additional Firm-Level Analysis
Highly knowledgeable workers may transfer knowledge or know-how
not directly reflected in TFP. For example, if highly productive firms have
different management practices as reflected in their input intensity choices,
knowledgeableworkersmay transfer these aswell. Table 1 shows thatHWFs
have greater capital and intangible capital intensity. Is there a relationship
between the hiring of knowledgeable workers and the intensity of these in-
puts at non-HWFs? To investigate this issue I have estimated the model
from table 2 using capital per worker and intangible capital per worker as
the dependent variable (in logs) instead of the value of production (and ex-
cluding the inputs as covariates). The coefficient on Hjst is positive in both
specifications (0.024 and 0.043, respectively) and highly significant.
In results not reported here, I have also explored, using interaction terms,
whether the coefficient on knowledgeable workers is larger if the receiving
firm has (i) high intangible capital intensity, (ii) high capital intensity, and
(iii) large firm size. I failed to find any significant differences. I have also in-
vestigated further heterogeneity at the sending firm level by distinguishing
between workers from HWFs with above versus below median (i) intangi-45 A non-HWF hiring at the mean exposure is shown to feature 0.13% higher
productivity compared with an observationally identical firm that hired no one.
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Able capital intensity, (ii) capital intensity, and (iii) firm size. Once again, I
failed to find any significant differences.
VI. Worker Flows and Agglomeration Advantages
In this section, I evaluate the extent to which labor mobility can explain
the productivity advantages of firms located near other highly productive
firms. In an influential study, Greenstone, Hornbeck, and Moretti (2010)
find that, following the opening of a large manufacturing plant, the TFP
of incumbent plants in the US counties that were able to attract these large
plants increased significantly relative to the TFP of incumbent plants in
counties that survived a long selection process but narrowly lost the com-
petition. Data limitations prevented Greenstone, Hornbeck, and Moretti
(2010) from drawing definitive conclusions regarding the underlyingmech-
anism. I am able to evaluate the extent to which worker flows explain the
productivity advantages of agglomeration by predicting the change in local
productivity following an event analogous to that studied by Greenstone,
Hornbeck, and Moretti (2010) within the worker mobility framework de-
scribed above.More specifically, I study the effect of an increase in the num-
ber of good firms such that the change in local output is comparable to the
output of the average large plant whose opening is considered by Green-
stone, Hornbeck, andMoretti (2010).46 The underlying idea is that employ-
ees at these good firms acquire the relevant firm’s internal knowledge. After
a certain amount of time (in the empirical analysis I consider a 5-year hori-
zon) some of the knowledgeable workers switch jobs. Therefore, other lo-
cal firms can gain access to the superior knowledge by hiring such workers.
I focus on a change in the number of good local firms belonging to the
same industry as firm j. This is motivated by Henderson (2003), Cingano
and Schivardi (2004), Moretti (2004), and Greenstone, Hornbeck, and
Moretti (2010), who found that local spillovers are increasing in economic
proximity. Denote the number of knowledgeable workers moving within46 The large plants in Greenstone, Hornbeck, and Moretti (2010) generated bid-
ding from local governments almost certainly because there was a belief of impor-
tant positive effects on the local economy. Greenstone, Hornbeck, and Moretti
(2010) observe that the mean increase in TFP after the opening is larger if incum-
bent plants are economically close to the large plant—economic links are measured
using dummy variables indicating belonging to the same industry, indicators of
technological linkages, and measures of worker flows at the industry level. Further-
more, the TFP effect increases over time. These facts are consistent with the pres-
ence of intellectual externalities that are embodied in workers who move from firm
to firm. I think of the plants considered by Greenstone, Hornbeck, and Moretti
(2010) as “good” plants, and in order to simulate their experiment I consider a
change in the number of good firms such that the change in output in a given
Veneto LLM is comparable.
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Aindustry observed at firm j byHind. An overview of my procedure (in three
steps) is as follows.
1. I estimate the effect on Hind of a change in the number of good local
firms belonging to the same industry as firm j.
2. Using the estimates from step 1, I predict the change inHind that each
of the non-HWFs in a LLMwould experience if a positive agglomer-
ation shock within the local industry similar to the one considered by
Greenstone,Hornbeck, andMoretti (2010) were to occur. I thenmul-
tiply the predicted change inHind bycbH ind, the estimated coefficient on
Hind in the firm-level productivity regression. This product yields the
predicted change in productivity due to worker flows for a given
Veneto firm if its local industry were to experience an increase in out-
put analogous to that considered by Greenstone, Hornbeck, and
Moretti (2010).
3. I compare my estimate of the predicted contribution of worker flows
to productivity changes with Greenstone, Hornbeck, and Moretti
(2010)’s estimate of the overall productivity effect. This comparison
allows us to get a sense of the extent to which worker flows can ex-
plain the productivity gains experienced by other firms when high-
productivity firms in the same industry are added to a LLM.A. Step 1: Dynamic Effect on the Number of Knowledgeable
Workers of a Change in the Number of Good Firms
I now discuss the issues related to the implementation of the first step,
that is, the estimation of the dynamic effect onHindj of a change in the num-
ber of good firms in the same locality and industry. In practice, as I explain
in detail below (under step 2), I consider the predicted change in H that a
typical non-HWFwould experience 5 years after a large change in the num-
ber of good local firms. Recall that if a worker is hired at time t 2 g and has
experience at a HWF between t 2 g and t 2 3, she contributes to the count
of knowledgeable workers from year t 2 g until t. This implies that Hind
may exhibit some degree of persistence and suggests estimation of a dynamic
model.
Consider a model of the form
Hindjlst 5 aH
ind
jsl,t21 1 bGood_Firmsls jð Þt 1 ejlst, (9)
ejlst 5 mj 1 vjlst,
E mj
 
5 E vjlst
 
5 E mjvjlst
 
5 0, (10)
whereGood_Firmsls( j)t is the number of local goodfirms at time t in the same
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Aing within industry. The disturbance term ejlst has two orthogonal compo-
nents: the firm effect,mj, and the idiosyncratic shock, vjlst. UsingOLS to es-
timate equation (9) is problematic because the correlation between Hindjsl,t21
and the firm effect in the error term gives rise to dynamic panel bias (Nickell
1981). Application of the within-groups estimator would draw the firm ef-
fects out of the error term, but dynamic panel bias would remain (Bond
2002). Therefore, I employ thefirst-difference transform, proposed byArel-
lano and Bond (1991):
DHindjlst 5 aDH
ind
jsl,t21 1 bDGood_Firmsls jð Þt 1 Dvjlst: (11)
The firm effects have now disappeared, but the lagged dependent variable
is still potentially endogenous as theHindjsl,t21 in DH
ind
jsl,t21 5 H
ind
jsl,t21 2 H
ind
jsl,t22 is
correlated with the vjls,t21 in Dvjlst 5 vjls,t 2 vjls,t21. However, appropriately
lagged values of the levels of the regressors remain orthogonal to the error
and are available for use as instruments. Blundell and Bond (1998) show that
under appropriate assumptions about the initial conditions we can use ap-
propriately lagged values of the differences of the regressors as instruments
for the equation in levels. In the system generalized method of moments
(GMM) estimator, which I employ below, the orthogonality conditions for
the differenced equation (12) are augmented by the orthogonality conditions
for the level equation (9).
In principle, another challenge in estimating equation (12) is that firms in
a given industry do not select their location randomly. Firms maximize
profits and decide to locate where their expectation of the present discounted
value of future profits is greatest. This net present value differs across loca-
tions depending on several factors, including transportation infrastructure,
cheap availability of local inputs, and so on. Some of these factors, whose
value may be different for firms in different industries, are unobserved,
and they may be correlated with DHindjlst . Therefore, DGood_Firmsls( j)t is treated
as endogenous.
Table 7 gives the results of estimating equation (12) for the period 1992–
2001.47 Column 1 uses the systemGMM estimator. I restrict the instrument
set to lags 3 and longer, as suggested by the result of the Arellano-Bond test
for serial correlation.48 The p-value of the Hansen test for overidentifying
restrictions does not suggest misspecification. The regression shows a pos-
itive and significant coefficient on the number of good local firms (b^), in line47 Since these specifications do not require information collected from AIDA
balance sheets, the sample period is not restricted to post-1995 observations. I in-
clude time dummies in order to remove universal time-related shocks from the er-
rors.
48 Arellano and Bond (1991) develop a test for autocorrelation in the idiosyncratic
disturbance term vjlst. It checks for serial correlation of order l in levels by looking for
correlation of order l 1 1 in differences.
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Awith the descriptive evidence discussed above of an important role of geo-
graphic and economic proximity in determiningworkermobility. Column 1
of table 7 also shows a positive and significant coefficient for the lagged de-
pendent variable (a^). The economic significance of a^ and b^ is described below
(see the discussion of table 8 under step 2).
In column 2, I estimate the model with two-step system GMM and
Windmeijer-corrected (Windmeijer 2005) cluster-robust errors.49 In col-
umns 1 and 2, for all variables only the shortest allowable lag is used as
an instrument. In columns 3 and 4, I estimate the same specifications as in col-
umns 1 and 2, including lags up to 4 and 5, respectively. The estimates in col-
umns 2–4 are similar to those in column 1.
B. Step 2: Labor Mobility and LLM Productivity
Having estimated the dynamic effect onHindj of a change inGood_Firmsls( j)t,
I can predict the change in Hindj —and hence in productivity—that a non-
HWF in Veneto would experience after an output increase similar to the one
considered by Greenstone, Hornbeck, and Moretti (2010). As it turns out,
the large manufacturing plants whose openings are studied by Greenstone,
Hornbeck, and Moretti (2010) are much larger than the typical good firmTable 7
Number of Local High-Wage Firms (HWFs) in Same Industry and
Knowledgeable Workers Moving within Industry, System Generalized
Method of Moments (GMM) Estimates, 1992–2001
Baseline
(1)
Two Step
(2)
Lags Up to 4
(3)
Lags Up to 5
(4)
Lag (H from same industry) .144 .136 .147 .159
(.0719) (.0653) (.0717) (.0660)
Local HWFs in same industry .009 .009 .010 .009
(.0012) (.0012) (.0015) (.0014)
Observations 25,688 25,688 25,688 25,688
AR(1)z 22.124 22.436 22.172 22.337
AR(2)z 26.062 26.339 26.057 26.010
AR(3)z .304 .196 .337 .460
Hansen p-value .321 .321 .607 .94149 See Roodman (2009) for
meijer correction.
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Ain Veneto.50 To observe a change in local output comparable to the typical
output increase caused by the opening of one large plant in Greenstone,
Hornbeck, andMoretti (2010), a Veneto locality must experience an increase
of 56 HWFs. This is the shock I consider for my calculations of the effect
of labor mobility on LLM productivity.
The predicted change inH that a typical non-HWFwould experience af-
ter 5 years, the time horizon considered in Greenstone, Hornbeck, andMo-
retti (2010), is then dDHind,5 years 5 56  ðb 1 ab 1 a2b 1 a3b 1 a4b 1 a5bÞ.
This change inH can be obtained using the estimates for a and b in equa-
tion (12) from table 7.51 To obtain the predicted change in productivity, I es-
timate a variant of equation (3) in which the variable of interest is the number
of knowledgeable workers moving within industry (Hind).52 The predicted
change in productivity attributable to worker flows 5 years after the local
output increase is then equal to dDTFPind,5 years 5 dDHind,5 years  cbH ind. In the case
of the IV, the number of new entrants is multiplied by the probability ofTable 8
Worker Flows and Agglomeration Advantages
OLS
(1)
OP
(2)
LP
(3)
Investment-
Capital
Interactions
in t, t 1 1
(4)
Investment-
Materials
Interactions
in t, t 1 1
(5)
IV
(6)
cbH ind .036 .037 .031 .022 .026 .121
Probability of HWF downsize .178dDTFPind,5 years 5 dDHind,5 years  cbH ind .021 .022 .018 .013 .015 .013dDTFPind,5 years=overall agglomeration effect .125 .128 .107 .076 .090 .07550 This is due both to the fact that
Moretti (2010) are significantly large
States and to the fact that the Venet
small and medium-sized businesses, w
the United States. See app. sec. A.VI f
51 I use the estimates in col. 1, whic
results untabulated here I have also e
knowledgeable workers, laggingGoo
namic panel IV estimator. The coeffic
equal to 0.019, yielding dDH ind,5 years 5 5
52 The estimates of cbH ind using the
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Adownsizing. Table 8 provides a summation of the calculations concerning
the effect of labor mobility on LLM productivity. The predicted change in
productivity attributable to worker flows 5 years following a large local out-
put increase ranges from 1.3% to 2.2% depending on the specification.
C. Step 3: Comparison with Greenstone,
Hornbeck, and Moretti (2010)
The final step is to compare the magnitude of dDTFPind,5 years with Green-
stone, Hornbeck, and Moretti (2010)’s estimate of the overall productivity
effect caused by a local output increase. The increase in productivity esti-
mated byGreenstone,Hornbeck, andMoretti (2010) 5 years after the open-
ing for incumbent plants in the same two-digit industry is 17%. Hence, my
calculations indicate that worker flows explain 8%–13% of the agglomer-
ation advantages estimated by Greenstone, Hornbeck, and Moretti (2010),
with the mean of the point estimates being 10%.
VII. Further Analysis
A. Additional LLM-Level Analysis
Recall my previous discussion of the agglomeration literature. A consen-
sus has emerged that agglomeration economies can at least partially explain
why firms cluster next to each other. Disagreement remains, however, over
the sources of these agglomeration effects. In the above, I emphasized the
possibility that knowledge is embedded inworkers anddiffuseswhenwork-
ers move between firms. The strong localized aspect of knowledge spill-
overs discussed in the agglomeration literature may thus arise from the pro-
pensity of workers to change jobs within the same LLM.
Another explanation that has been proposed in the literature is the pos-
sibility of advantages from thick labor markets. The argument is that ag-
glomeration allows a better match between employer needs and worker
skills, which may result in higher productivity (Helsley and Strange 1990).
To explore the relevance of thismechanism in theVenetomanufacturing sec-
tor context, I estimate a production function for non-HWFfirm j in industry
s andLLM l augmented byboth the number of goodfirms and the number of
nongood firms in industry s and LLM l:
ln Yjslt
 
5 ~b0 1 ~bL ln Ljslt
 
1 ~bK ln Kjslt
 
1 ~bM ln Mjslt
 
1 bGGood_Firmsls jð Þt
1bNNongood_Firmsls jð Þt 1 ϱjslt:
(12)
I use both OLS and the system GMM estimator proposed by Blundell and
Bond (1998). When using the latter, both the number of good firms and the
number of nongood firms are treated as endogenous (I experiment with dif-This content downloaded from 095.248.198.226 on April 25, 2019 09:33:36 AM
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Aferent lags of the instruments). The results are shown in table 9. The number
of good firms is positively and statistically significantly related to an in-
crease in the productivity of non-HWF j. A 1 standard deviation change
inGood_Firms is associated with a TFP change of 1.4%–3.5% after 5 years
for a given firm j. Multiplying the estimated percentage change by the mean
value of non-HWF output, this calculation indicates that the increase inTable 9
Number of Local High-Wage Firms (HWFs) and Productivity, 1995–2001
OLS
(1)
System GMM
(2)
Two-Step
System GMM
(3)
log(capital) .0940 .0176 .0250
(.0050) (.0586) (.0695)
log(materials) .5849 .6275 .6215
(.0109) (.0463) (.0555)
log(employees) .2295 .0034 .0044
(.0104) (.0109) (.0117)
Lag 5 (local HWFs in same industry) .0028
(.0007)
Lag 5 (local non-HWFs in same industry) 2.0008
(.0003)
Lag 1 log(output) .9839 .9766
(.0545) (.0559)
Lag 1 log(capital) 2.0274 2.0320
(.0527) (.0650)
Lag 1 log(materials) 2.6140 2.6077
(.0502) (.0573)
Lag 1 log(employees) .0095 .0118
(.0154) (.0184)
Local HWFs in same industry .0009 .0010
(.0006) (.0006)
Local non-HWFs in same industry 2.0010 2.0010
(.0006) (.0006)
bHWFs 5 bnon-HWFs, p-value .000 .076 .072
Observations 17,158 13,501 13,501
AR(1)z 211.88 210.60
AR(2)z .782 .827
AR(3)z 1.954 1.969
AR(4)z 21.147 21.169
Hansen p-value .874 .874
Adjusted R2 .931This content downloaded from 095
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ATFP due to a typical change in the number of local good firms is associated
with an increase in total output of €198,000–€219,000 (in 2000 euros).53 The
coefficient of the number of nongood firms is either negative and significant
or insignificant depending on the specification. The difference in productiv-
ity effects associated with each type of firm is significant. This introduction
ofNongood_Firms can also be seen as a placebo test at the LLM level, and it
suggests that the local productivity effect attributed to good firms is not as-
sociatedwith an increase in the size of the labormarket in general: large pro-
ductivity gains linked to changes in the number of firms seem to be realized
onlywhen the firms are good. Although I am not able to entirely discard the
chance that at least part of the estimated impact reflects better worker-firm
matching arising from a thicker labor market, this finding supports the hy-
pothesis of labor market–based knowledge spillovers in the Veneto manu-
facturing sector context.
B. Wages of Workers at Non-HWFs
Given that the sending firms do not receive any compensation from the
receiving firms, the presence of knowledge transfer through worker flows
arguably implies a positive externality (Stoyanov and Zubanov 2014, 17).
In table 10 I investigate how much of this externality is transferred to the
employees in the form of higher wages.
First, I attempt to evaluate the wage premium for movers fromHWFs to
non-HWFs. Column 1 shows that the premium, conditional on worker
characteristics (tenure, tenure squared, age, age squared, a dummy variable
for manager and white-collar status, and interaction terms between gender
and other individual characteristics), is on average 7.3%. The mean annual
wage in the sample is about €19,300 (in 2000 euros), obtained aftermultiply-
ing the mean daily wage (€62; see table A12) by the number of yearly work-
ing days (312). When expressed as a percentage of the mean, it appears that
the wage premium is small in monetary terms with respect to the increase in
TFP calculated in Section V.A. This evidence is only suggestive, but it is
consistent with the finding of Stoyanov and Zubanov (2014) for Denmark,
who discuss two potential explanations: “First, the hiring firms are unable to
precisely identify the source of these gains due to uncertainty regarding the
spillover potential of their workers. . . . Second, firms do observe the con-
tribution but do not pay their competitive wage because of other labor mar-
ket imperfections” (28).53 An interesting question is whether subsidies used to attract manufacturing
plants are close to optimal, too large, or too small. This exercise is difficult to ac-
complish within the current context because of the lack of systematic information
on the size of the subsidies offered by local governments in Veneto to plants to lo-
cate within their jurisdictions.
This content downloaded from 095.248.198.226 on April 25, 2019 09:33:36 AM
ll use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
“Good” Firms, Worker Flows, and Local Productivity 000
AColumn 2 show that the premium is 9 percentage points higher for
knowledgeable workers in higher-skilled occupations than for those in lower-
skilled occupations. Column 3 show that the results are similar when includ-
ing firm characteristics, industry  year, and LLM  year dummies.
Next, I investigate the relationship between the number of knowledge
workers and the wage of workers without HWF experience. The estimated
coefficient forH shown in columns 4 and 5 (0.007–0.012) represents a sig-
nificant fraction of the corresponding coefficients in the various TFP spec-
ifications of table 2. This finding is in line with the results in Van Reenen
(1996) who, using a panel of UK companies, reports that average wages at
a firm increase after a successful innovation.54
Finally, in column 6 and 7 I estimate a wage function for worker i em-
ployed by non-HWFfirm j in industry s andLLM l augmented by the num-
ber of goodfirms in industry s andLLM l. A 10% increase inGood_Firmsls( j)tTable 10
Wages of Workers at Non-High-Wage Firms (Non-HWFs)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Experience at HWF .073 .047 .068
(.003) (.003) (.005)
Higher skilled  experience .089
(.009)
H workers .012 .007
(.001) (.001)
Lag 5 (local HWFs in same
industry) .002 .002
(.001) (.000)
Industry  year dummies No No Yes No Yes No Yes
LLM  year dummies No No Yes No Yes No Yes
Firm characteristics No No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 1,005,082 1,005,082 686,635 681,743 681,743 681,743 681,743
Adjusted R2 .504 .491 .533 .456 .533 .452 .53354 The following com
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A(i.e., an increase of about 0.3 local good firms; see table A7) is associated with
a change of 0.06% after 5 years for a given worker at firm j.55
VIII. Conclusions
To empirically assess the importance of labor market–based knowledge
spillovers, I used Social Security earnings records and detailed financial in-
formation for firms from the Veneto region of Italy. I implemented several
empirical strategies, including control function methods, placebo tests, and
an IV approach.While none of these strategies is completely conclusive with
regard to identification, together they gave evidence consistent with knowl-
edge transfer through labor mobility. My findings imply that worker flows
can explain around 10%of the productivity gains experienced by incumbent
firms when new highly productive firms are added to a local labor market.
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